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THE JUDICIAL TRUTH 
Francesco Viola 
Everybody agrees that in judicial judgment truth is in question. 
In what sen se? In what sense can one attribute truth to the legal 
process? 
"The task of a judge is to decide whether the actual behaviour of 
one or other parties in dispute, or of both, conformed with the 
prescription contained in the relevant rule of law. This involves 
three kinds of knowledge: knowing what actually happened, i.e., 
the fact-situation; knowing the rule of law to be applied; both of 
which are part of the third kind of knowledge, namely, knowing 
how to give the right decision. It is popularly supposed that the 
frrst two are objective, the third largerly subjective" (Dias, 258). 
Usuallyoneihinks that the truth is located only in particular 
aspects that belong to the judicial decision. 1 refer to its conformity 
to empirical truth or to a preexistent norm. However one does not 
think that the whole decision, Le. just as a decision, has a specific 
truth. When one talks about judicial truth, one means the truth 
within the judicial decision, but not the truth 01 the judicial 
decision. 
The judicial decision concerns both facts and norms. Therefore 
it S(1ems that the truth-question must be divided into the quaestio 
lacti (factual truth) and into the quaestio juris (juridical truth). The 
two questions cannot be solved in the same way and, conse-
quently, the judicial decision as the final result has no epis-
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temological unity. It seems that a decision as a whole cannot be 
considered true or falseo 
"The problem of judicial truth does not concem the conclusions, 
i.e. specifically the decision" (Ferrajoli, 39). 
Gn the opposite side, one observes that the goal of a judicial 
decision is not the expression of personal convictions. The judge's 
duty is not to act on merely personal views. According to a 
traditional conception he is the bouche de la loí (Montesquieu). The 
right decision is that requested by the fact-situation and by the 
juridical system both things considered. If this decision is 
determined by the personal preferences of a judge, then it is false, 
because it is founded upon subjective and not objective criteria. If 
it could be false, then it might also be true. If there Ís only one 
right answer for every legal question in a juridical system 
(Dworkin 1978), then this answer is true as well. 
A legal- process does not aim at persuading anyone, but at 
justifying the decision. The judge's work is directed to show that 
his decision is grounded upon the rational and consistent 
application of rules accepted as valido The legal arguments are not 
valued on the basis of their persuasive force, but for their confor-
mity to the objective criteria that must rule a judicial decision. The 
justification as an activity that shows the reasons of a decision 
belongs to the field of truth. 
This movement towards the truth is rooted in the tradition of 
legal process and it sustains the conviction that a court's judgment 
sees the issues as a clear-cut either/or, black and white affair. 
"An important feature of the judgments of European courts has 
traditionally been that they produce a winner and a loser. Informal 
methods of dispute settlement, through mediators or arbitrators, 
can result in a compromise that gives something to both parties" 
(Stein, 27). 
AH these last considerations support the opinion that the judicial 
decision as such can be considered in some way true or falseo 
However the decision belongs to the field of practical reason which 
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- as people commonly think - concerns human will rather than 
human intellect. 
1 note by the way that this dispute about the truth of a legal 
judgment is determined by the general conception of legal 
judgement as well. If the legal process isconceived as being 
divided into sectors, that are in sorne way separable one from the 
other, then the final decision is only a sum of these separate 
investigations. I consider this conception only as accumulative, but 
not as a global conception of legal judgment. The final decision 
is the sum of the sectorial decisions concerning validity, inter-
pretation, evidence ... , each and every one of them has its truth-
criterion. However, following this line of thought, the unity of 
legal reasoning and deliberation is in serious danger. 
Are the sectors of judicial judgement the steps of the same 
process of action or are they the independent bricks of a building? 
Now 1 shall indicate three different ways, with which the 
problem of judicial truth is dealt and in which the decision as such 
is not considered as belonging to the field of truth. 
CONSTITUTIVE CONCEPTION VS . DECLARATIVE CONCEPTION 
Usually the problem of judicial truth is located only in the 
ascertainment of the fact-situations that are in question. From this 
point of view it seemS very important to determine the difference, 
if any, between the so-called judicial truth and the truth stated in 
the area of empirical science (Wróblewski, 180). 
On one side, there are undoubtedly legal rules of evidence that 
differ from rules of verification accepted as valid by empirical 
science. On the other, one legitimately thinks that the fact-situation 
exists only in one way and this is the empirical way of existence. 
ConsequentIy, there has to be only one way for the ascertainment 
of judicial truth, Le. the scientific verification. However, as the 
judge is also appointed to find and interpret the norms that he has 
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to apply, the legal process regards also aspects in which the 
empírical truth is put aside. 
The most relevant attempt of a unitary solution is that of Kelsen. 
Kelsen tries to avoid every epistemological break in the legal 
process, supporting the constitutive character of the judicial 
judgment, constitutive of facts and constitutive of norms. 
From the judge's viewpoint there are no natural facts, but only 
legal facts, i.e. facts settled by the judge's pronouncement. In 
place of the empirical verification, through which the scientist 
knows and constitutes the natural facts, there is the fact of the 
ascertainment by the judge, who is the competent authority (Kel-
sen, 244). A legallact is not a natural fact ascertained by a judge in 
a legal process, but it is the ascertainment itself. Thus the legal 
judgment has specific truth-criteria that are paraIlel to those of 
natural science, but distinct from it. The most relevant difference 
does not reside in particular methods, but in the normative 
appointment of a subject authorized to produce legal facts. 
Therefore Kelsen restores total autonomy to the world of legal 
knowledge and of legal reality. 
Nevertheless the asserted unity of the legal process puts the 
truth into the shade. According to Kelsen the judicial decision is a 
creation of law, on the contrary one cannot say that the scientific 
judgment is normative. Kelsen traces a sharp distinction between 
reason and volition, between cognition and decision, between 
science and politics. The whole enterprise of a legal judgement is 
marked by its final goal, which is a decision and, consequently, an 
individual norm. According to Kelsen every decision is not an act 
of cognition, but an act of wiIl. 
If a legal fact is the judicial ascertainment of a "natural fact" 
(Kelsen, 245), then the quaestio lacti is totally absorbed in the 
quaestio juris. There are general norms that establish who and 
what ought to determine the fact-situations, i.e. the procedural and 
substantive rules of judicial ascetainment. A legal fact is produced 
by a competent authority according to the juridical rules of 
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evidence. ConsequentIy, the truth of this ascertainment resides in 
the conformity with these norms. According to Kelsen the judicial 
truth is the relationship of a legal fact, Le. the judicial ascer-
tainment, to the norms. When the legal system authorizes the 
judges to use the cornmon empirical criteria (or their free convin-
cement) for the establishment of the fact-situations, this means that 
these criteria become "legal" in every respecto ConsequentIy, only 
another judge at a higher level (the judge of appeal) can verify the 
truth of a legal judgment, Le. this normative conformity. 
Three serious difficulties arise from this constitutive conception 
of judicial truth and aH three are bound to the kelsenian view of 
jurídical interpretation. 
FirstIy, we may observe that the total transformation of quaestio 
facti in quaestio iuris has completely internalized the problem of 
judicial truth. The autonomy of legal reality and of judicial truth is 
reached through the reproduction of facts inside the legal process. 
According to Kelsen the relevant problem from a jurídical point of 
view is not the correspondence of legal judgment to external world 
in sorne way, but the conformity of the judicial actions to legal 
norms. It is possible to control only this conformity and, through 
it, the judicial actions, however for the rest we are in the field of 
discretion, of decision, of will, Le. not of congnition nor truth 
(Luzzati). 
A judicial decision is also normaHy based on reasons that are 
partIy not in strict terms "legal" (Aarnio). They concern the 
application of general rules of logic and argumentation, cornmon 
sense, the framework of culture and consensus regarding expe-
rience and values, the recourse to probability, and so on. The 
authorization given to a judge using these reasons is not a dele-
gation of arbitrary power. In these fields we can find objective 
criteria of judgment and we can distinguish an arbitrary use 
of reasonableness from a well grounded one (Tapani Klami). 
Therefore a judge is obliged to justify his decision with a strong 
motivation. Besides, the judge of a higher level normally control s 
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not only the nonnative confonnity of a court's judgment (quaestio 
juris), but also the soundness of justificatory reasons concerning 
the establishment of the facts (quaestio jacti). However these 
criteria compel us to leave the mere nonnative confonnity and so 
confront reality in every sense. 
Secondly, we note moreover that effectively the judge of a 
higher level does not consider the judicial ascertainment of fact-
situations as a fact itself, but as a judgment about facts and as such 
he examines it. If it is a fact, then it cannot be criticized. It is not 
possible to put a fact into question, but only to ascertain it. 
Nevertheless Kelsen confuses facts and their ascertainment, or, 
more in general, truth and knowledge of truth, and this is not 
acceptable. One may say that according to Kelsen the problem of 
judicial truth can be seen only in the process of appeal in relation to 
the previous decision that is considered as legal fact. 
The third difficulty concerns the judgment of normative confor-
mity itself. We have said that here Kelsen poses namely the 
problem of legal truth, i.e. the normative qualification of natural 
facts. Every judgment of normative conformity is obviously an 
interpretation of norms. Here it does not deal only with the process 
of cognition of norms that ,have to be applied, but also with the 
choosing of one of the several possible meanings of norms 
themselves. Authentic interpretation, i.e. the interpretation of a 
competent authority like a judge, is not only the identification of a 
norm, but also a concrete choice or determination made by the 
judge (or by another legal authority). So it is the result of an act of 
will, not of mere cognition (Paulson). Besides, from the judge's 
point of view, i.e. the application of the law, it is not possible to 
identify a norm without determining its content. The concrete 
choice of a settled meaning tends to construct the general frame of 
a norm and not vice versa. Therefore the judgment of normative 
conformity is the field of choice and, consequently, not of truth. 
In conclusion, the Kelsen's thought, either regarding the ascer-
tainment of facts or regarding the interpretation of norms, really 
THE JUDICIAL TRUTH 255 
leaves no room for truth in a judicial decision. The characteristic of 
legal judgment is not the judicial truth, but the indisputable 
pronouncement of a subject appointed by legal norms. 
The supporters of the mere declarative character of the judicial 
decision refuse this kelsenian conception (Alchourrón-Bulygin). 
The judicial decision is descriptive of natural facts and descriptive 
of legal norms. They argue that the kelsenian reduplication of the 
empírical truth (natural fact and fact of the judicial ascertainment) is 
not acceptable, because the empirical truth is only one and only 
upon it the judicial decision must be based. 
The question is not only epistemological, but polítical and 
ethical too. The sentence "Tom killed Jim" is true if Jim has really 
been killed by Tom. The truthfulness of this sentence is a ne-
cessary condition of the justice of a judicial decision. The pro-
nouncement of a judge is not a starting fact, but a judgment that 
must be measured by what has effectively happened. The facts are 
what they are and not what judges say they are. We consider a 
judicial decision as unjust when the ascertainment of fact-situations 
does not correspond with reality. 
Consequently, if judicial truth is located only in the ascer-
tainment of facts, there isn't any specific truth for the legal 
judgment. Its truth is the empírical truth of science itself. 
The kelsenian conception of the constitutivedimension of the 
judicial decision frees the judge's ascertainment from the control of 
empírical truth. In contrast to this conception one may remark that 
there is only one truth, which depends on the semantic rules of the 
language used and on natural facts to which the statements are 
referred. The truth of a judicial decision, as far as it concems the 
quaestio ¡acti, resides in the conformity to the natural facts. There 
is only one truth, that is semantic truth, and it concems all 
judgments, the legal judgments as well. 
Along these línes, however, the epistemological break is 
unavoidable. 
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Nevertheless, when the ascertainment of fact-situations is 
disputed, one must acknowledge that the task of a judge has many 
peculiarities which are not absorbed only in mere description. The 
judgment of the facts depends on many determining factors that 
have a normative character. 1 do not refer only to the rules of 
evidence that determine the legal truth of sorne facts, but spe-
cifically to the choice among different descriptions of the same 
fact. At least in the present structure of a legal process (Stein, 29), 
the judge is judge of evidence too. A judge must stablish if there 
are sufficient elements for the evidence of a fact. 
On the other hand, the identification of sorne facts is connected 
to the interpretation of norms. FrequentIy such interpretation is the 
presupposition of the judgment on facts as far as the judge must 
ascertain only aH those facts to which a norm has to be applied. 
Moreover it is possible to design a typology of the facts on the 
basis of the way in which the corresponding norms define them 
(Wróblewski, 108). 
These observations explain a trend that is present in·the judicial 
practice of Common Law, i.e. the trend of transforming questions 
of fact into questions of law. 
In conc1usion, even if we must reject the kelsenian absorption 
of the quaestio facti in the quaestio juris, we cannot accept the 
independence of the one from the other. 
The necessary linkage between fact and law strengthens the 
opinion that legal process must be considered as "a seamless web". 
The question of truth concems the whole judicial practice and not 
only separated parts of it. 
Even as regards the truth of fact-situations we cannot as sume 
sic et simpliciter the truth stated in the area of empirical science. 
For the supporters of verificationism this remark seems to 
throw the juridical investigation out from the scientific field. The 
judicial decision falls prey to subjectivism. 
The conc1usion is that not only the decision as such is subjective 
but also knowing the fact-situations and the law (Dias, 258). Of 
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course this subjectivism is not unlimited otherwise people could 
not have any confidence in the judicial enterprise. The decision is 
controlled by consensual domains, principally linguistic conven-
tions and shared values. 
There is a widespread opinion that the specific character of a 
judicial judgement is not truthfulness, but rightness that is based 
upon norms and value-judgements (Peczenik, 46). According to 
non-cognitivism these criteria of control can be neither true nor 
false, because they are not empírical in factual sen se. 
There is a strong separation between truthfulness and rightness. 
A decision cannotbe true or false, but right or wrong. Conse-
quently, by virtue of the principIe of unity in a legal process the 
ascertainment of facts and the application of law can only be right 
or wrong too. 
Nevertheless also rightness or correctness of a decision can be 
judged, criticized and controlled in a similar way to that followed 
by the control of a statement. The difference resides in the criteria 
of controls itself. One thinks that the control of the decisions is 
based on social rules that are changeable, contextual and relativist. 
On the contrary, the control of a statement would be based on the 
"indisputable" criteria of empirical verification. Therightness of a 
decision is its capacity to fit correctIy into these relativist social 
rules accepted as valid in a particular social contexto 
Nevertheless the social model of the judicial interpretation and 
application of law is disputable. According to this conception the 
judge must decide the hard cases following the prevailing opinions 
of the citizens on their juridical duties. In this way he is bound by 
an objective criterion, even if this objectivity is not that of the truth. 
However in fluralistic society, where different moral and social 
views are in onflict, the judge can use the social consensus neither 
as an aid fo solving the hard cases nor as a limit to his dis-
cretionary po ero On the contrary, in this situation the judge has to 
value the different opinions about the identity of a legal practice 
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(Dworkin 1977, p. 53). What could prevent him from using his 
personal views? 
Consequently, when rightness is not considered as a shape of 
truth, then the fall into a sceptical solution is unavoidable. 
In conclusion, we have a constitutive conception of the legal 
judgment vs. a declarative conception. The rejection of both seems 
to lead to the judicial scepticism. From my point of view the 
constitutive and declarative conceptions are both criticizable and 
refutable, but I think that the sceptical solution destroys the judicial 
enterprise and its finality too. 
A PLURALISTIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH 
We cannot solve the problem of truth if we don't pay attention 
to the subjects that look for the truth and to their attitudes. When 
we ask ourselves what makes a statement true, we must examine 
the context to which it belongs. This context also consists of the 
intentions and the interests of those who act in it. The variety of 
intentions produces the variety of games or of practices. 
The wittgensteinian model of a language game is characterized 
not only by the rules, but also by the specification of the winning 
situation. Whoever plays must play to win. Whoever accepts to 
engage himself in the game, al so accepts to strive towards the 
winning situation. Thus the aim at making true statements is 
attained in different ways in relation to the different fields of 
experience. 
We aim at making true statements in very different fields, 
including not only factual knowledge, but also domains related to 
duties, obligations, justice, sense of life. I share a pluralistic, 
analogical and polysemic conception of truth. Therefore 1 consider 
every shape of reductionism a dangerous enemy. 
One could ask whether the enterprise of the judge is specifically 
the attainment of truth. One could affirm that truth is only one 
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among the conditions throught which the judicial judgment is 
successful in the pursuit of its aim or in the attainment of its goal. 
However this aim or this target totally considered is not that of an 
achievement of the truth, but specifically the application of law. 
The truth concems the quaestio lacti and, perhaps, the quaestio 
juris. Nevertheless the decision that is the ultimate goal of the 
judge's work should not belong to the field of the truth. When one 
decides, the truth is not in question, but the problem concems 
directly the right application of a normative criterion and its use as 
a guide for a particular action. 
A decision must be justified and this justification must be based 
upon legal reasoning. However the target of this rational process is 
not the truth, but the acceptability of a decision for the jurídical 
system considered. As noted aboye, rightness seems to be strongly 
separated from truth. Nevertheless, if we consider the intentions of 
a judge, through his decision he will grasp a truth and will make 
true affirmations. He believes he is playing thetruth-game. This is 
the meaning of the jus dicere. 
If we accept the pluralistic conception of truth, we can uphold 
that this belief of the judge is not a mistake. 
Here is not the place for an examination or the so-called "co-
rrespondence theory" of truth. Without entering this discussion, 
we can note that a strict conception of the correspondence theory 
has contributed to limiting a great deal of the variety of the truth-
games. However, if we want to concede a wider horizon to the 
achievement of truth, we are not obliged to reject totally the 
correspondence theory. Certainly sorne versions of the corres-
pondence theory are untenable (e.g. the correspondence as a 
mirror), but something of it must be preserved, because the truth is 
a relationship between two things so that one of them plays the role 
of criterion of measure and control for the other. 
Other than this pluralistic character of the attainment of truth, we 
should consider that it is an activity and, therefore, consists of acts. 
of application. The assertion, indeed, is an act of application that 
260 FRANCESCO VIOLA 
eoneerns the truth criteria, on one side, and a parti.eular sentenee on 
the other. Through this aetivity a sentenee is in tended to be 
asserted of its referents. There isn't any attribution of truthfulness 
without applieation. Consequendy the applieation of law must not 
be eonsidered a mere aet of will but also as an aetivity similar to the 
applieation of truth eriteria to a sentenee. 
THE GAME OF PRACTICAL TRUTH 
On the basis of these observations we ean design three large 
spheres into whieh. the truth-games are growing in many shapes. 
These spheres are distinguished as regards the "things" that are 
related and as regards the different determination of the truth 
eriteria. These spheres are eonnected to eaeh other in the same way 
as are coneentrie circles. One of them may include the others as its 
presuppositions. One of the most remarkable eharaeteristics of a 
truth-game is its hermeneutic relation to another language game 
(Apel, 368). The search for truth is always a seeond order 
investigation, embracing other aetivities and presupposing other 
games, sometimes other truth games. 
If we want to determine the truth game in whieh we play, we 
need to know - as I have said aboye - the intention of the pI ayer. 
Thus we eould judge whether he has broken the rules or has 
eomplied with them. 
The first sphere is that of descriptive or semantic truth. The 
intention of the player is directéd to knowing how the things are. 
The elements of this relation are, on one side, the sentenees and, 
on the other, the things themselves. It is clear that the quality of 
being true pertains to a sentence if it stays in a eertain relation to 
reality, to the actual "state of affairs". The deseriptive sentenees 
refer to something whieh we eall for that reason its referents. 
Nevertheless we must not eonfuse - as the old neopositivism has 
confused - the meaning and the referent of a term with the meaning 
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and the referent of a sentence. The referents of several tenns rnay 
be established directly by means of non-linguistic procedures. The 
reference precedes and detennines the meaning. On the contrary 
the referent of a sentence is determined by its meaning. Only after 
an understanding of the meaning may the question arise about the 
truth of a sentence. The problem of answering this question, which 
is how a sentence is asserted of its referents, may be sol ved in 
rnany ways. There are different ways of asserting how the things 
are. This difference constitutes the distinction of the disciplines or 
fields of investigation. Descriptive sentences tend to be organized 
according to sorne fundamental viewpoints under which reality is 
going to be scrutinized. 
Now it is c1ear that the search for descriptive truth persupposes 
another activity, i.e. understanding. Understanding as well may be 
considered not only as an element of the game of descriptive truth, 
but also a truth game iself. The hermeneutic truth does not aim at 
describing facts, but at grasping the deep sen se of the sentences, of 
the symbols or other non-sentential and non-verbal signs. Here the 
relation is not between sentences and their external referents, but 
between what is interpreted and the context in which the sentence 
is inc1uded and in which the sentence finds its rneaning. The 
intention is not that of describing but rather of giving sorne global 
interpretation. The totality of the context constitutes the criterion of 
measure and of meaning as regards its parts. The scientific theories 
are not a mass of descriptive propositions but rather totalities that 
confer sense to those sentences that have to be verified. Thus it is 
now generally accepted that hermeneutic dimension penetrates into 
descriptive dimension, even if the game of hermeneutic truth has to 
be distinguished from that of descriptive truth. 
This relationship between description and hermeneutic activity 
may be noted in the work of the judge as well. The quaestio facti 
and the quaestio juris are not separated, because here the search for 
descriptive truth is ruled by an understanding which is based upon 
a referent that is a normative system. For instance, killing or 
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stealing are acts which are qualified and defined by juridical 
norms. This is one aspect that the kelsenian approach has grasped 
perfectly. Nevertheless we must not stop here. 
My thesis is that the enterprise of the judge shapes a further 
trurh-game, that includes the descriptive and hermeneutic games 
but which is ruled by a distinct intention. I shall call it "the game of 
practical truth". Now the elements of the relationship are no longer 
sentences and reality, or sentences and discoursive contexts but 
rather actions: the action that has to be judged and the action that 
ought to be. The problem that the judge must solve is that of their 
relationship. 
The judicial decision encounters a problem of objectivity. The 
distinction between a judge and a mediator consists specifically in 
the fact that the former is appointed to apply preexistent normative 
criteria. Moreover we don't desire that ajudge decides according to 
his personal opinions, however sound and noble they may be. 
When one appeals to the objectivity, there is a question of truth. 
The judicial decision must not avoid answering a question of truth. 
The res iudicata is essentially a judgment in which an action is 
valued on the basis of a model and this is how an action ought to 
be. The Sallen of an action is its measure or its ideal mode!. 
Therefore there could be a difference between what the action has 
been and how it ought to be. The judicial judgment looks for the 
truth when it determines the right measure of a particular action. 
Therefore the rightness or the rectification is for an action the same 
thing as its truth. 
As I have said aboye, the game of practical truth embraces other 
truth games, but now I must add that it rules them and in same way 
it transform them. The semantic and hermeneutic truth are now 
subjected to particular conditions of practice which are determined 
by its specific finality. 
If we want to understand better the difference between the 
semantic truth and the practical truth, we must consider the 
different attitude of the latter with regard to an action. Here the 
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event and its happening are questioned. This event is no longer 
considered from the point of view of its necessity; it is not afact in 
a natural sense, according to which what has happened cannot be 
put into question any more. A natural fact is how it must be. On 
the contrary we are now in the field of possibility. The event-action 
could be (and perhaps ought to be) different from that which has 
been. A natural fact cannot be disputed but only verified. On the 
contrary, in the game of practical truth a particular action is 
questioned. If it could be different, then one needs to value the 
reasons that justify its happening. 
Consequently this historical event cannot be explained only by a 
cause in an empirical sense, but one must look for the reasons of 
the actions. These actions must be identified and this task requests 
the activity of interpreting and balancing reasons. Therefore the 
judge needs to test the soundness of the reasons that sustain the 
happening of the actions. In its turn this activity of interpretation as 
well is sustained by reasons. The judge must justify the ascer-
tainment of the fact-situation and his judgment on it. 
The natural scientist looks for the causes of events, while the 
judge looks for the reasons of actions. The deep difference 
consists in the different structure of the facts that have to be 
scrutinized: natural facts in the former case, and institutionalfacts 
in the latter (MacCormick-Weinberger). To know an institutional 
fact one needs to value it. Consequently, inside the game of 
practical truth the semantic and hermeneutic exploration intertwine 
in an inseparable way. 
If the problem was only to say how things ought to be, then it 
could be doubted whether we are in the field of truth. However 
this is not the target of the judicial judgement. Instead it aims at 
knowing whether the things are how they ought to be. 
"A judge does not seek simply to 'do justice', nor simply to 
'apply law'; he seeks to 'do justice according to law'" (Dias, 274). 
It is my opinion that this truth-game must be distinguished from 
the others, because it presupposes a specific intention of the 
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playero This finality resides neither in saying how the things are, 
nor in saying what they mean or in saying how the things ought to 
be. On the contrary here the problem is that of the relationship 
between how the things are and how they ought to be. There are, 
therefore, all the conditions requested by a truth-game: a relation 
between two things, an examination of their correspondence or 
conformity and the possibility of an objective control on the basis 
of non-hypothetical criteria. 
Within this cognitive enterprise we encounter the descriptive 
truth and the hermeneutic truth as well. However they are now 
absorbed and subordinated to this new dimension of truth, that 
concerns the total finality of a judicial decision. 
The nature of a practice imposes its conditions upon the search 
for truth. A scientific investigation cannot be limited in any way. 
The question always remains open to a further exploration. On the 
contrary, the judicial investigation must reach a definitive result, 
because its final term is not a theoretical truth, but a practical one. 
Therefore the pronouncement of a judge has the shape of a verdict, 
i.e. conclusively verum dicere. 
Moreover we must note that this judgment concerning the 
actions is an action itself, an act of application, that fits into the 
general framework of ajuridical practice and preserves its identity, 
correcting the event which has happened. Through the decision 
one not only says the truth but also makes the truth. This is the full 
sense of practical truth, i.e. the concrete rectification of an action. 
In conclusion, one could ask why the question of the identity 
between truthfulness and rightness is so crucial and whether it is 
only a nominalistic problem that has not any relevance for the 
concrete solutions. If rightness does not concern the truth, then it 
is only an expedient or a remedy, albeit rational, for solving the 
social conflicts in sorne way. On the contrary rightness may be 
considered a kind of truthfulness if the criteria of evaluation and 
control used are provided by a strong normativity, albeit not 
conclusive. 
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A juridical system must not be reputed only as a set of 
hypothetical norms and values. There are normative conditions for 
the identificacion of a set of prescriptions as a system of law. 1 
don't argue that there are determinate moral standards for the 
identification and assessment of positive law, but rather that there 
are a range of moral concepts, themselves susceptible to differing 
and conflicting moral interpretation, in terms of which positive law 
must be justified and criticised (Duff, 87). 
This means to take the law as social practice seriously, re-
jecting, on one side, the sceptical point of view about truth and, on 
the other, the absolutist point of view. 
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